Quickstart
Get Dristi up and running in under 5 minutes. Three commands — install tools, configure agents, start hunting.
Installation
Prerequisites
- Linux (Ubuntu 22.04+, Debian 12+, Arch, Fedora) or macOS
- Git, curl, sudo access
- OpenCode CLI installed (
npm install -g @opencode/cli) - LLM API key (Claude, GPT, or Ollama for local)
1. Install Tools (install.sh)
Installs 60+ security tools: Go binaries, Python packages, Cargo crates, Playwright Chromium, GF patterns, and SecLists.
2. Configure Agents (setup.sh)
Sets up the Dristi agent definitions, OpenCode config, and MCP server configuration.
3. Connect Burp Suite (Optional)
For active testing with Burp proxy:
Usage
Quickstart — Your First Engagement
Start OpenCode in the project directory and describe your target in plain English:
Agents auto-load by topic — you don't need to remember agent names. Just describe what you're testing.
Running the Full Pipeline
Dristi offers three modes for running the 12-phase pipeline:
1. Autopilot (fully autonomous):
Dispatches all 12 phases via sub-agents. Auto-checks phase gates, auto-checkpoints, handles WAF detection, activates conditional phases (DeepThink, Search) automatically, and ends with a full report. No human intervention needed.
2. Consult (interactive):
Same pipeline, but pauses at every phase transition. Presents findings, suggests next steps, and asks for your approval before proceeding. Best for learning the methodology or when you want oversight.
3. Manual (step-by-step):
Invoke each agent individually. You control the transitions and gates. Best for targeted single-class testing when you already know what you want to do.
Targeting Specific Vulnerability Classes
Describe what you see, and the right agent loads automatically. Or invoke by name:
Enterprise & Platform Testing
Slash Commands
Available inside OpenCode conversations for quick actions:
Finding Validation — The 7-Question Gate
Before any finding enters your report, it passes through the 7-Question Gate:
- Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW with a real HTTP request?
- Is the impact on the program's accepted-impact list?
- Is the vulnerable asset in scope?
- Does it work without privileged access an attacker can't get?
- Is this not already known or documented behavior?
- Can impact be proved beyond "technically possible"?
- Is this NOT on the never-submit list?
Verdicts: PASS → proceed to report | DOWNGRADE → lower severity, still report | CHAIN REQUIRED → needs another primitive | KILL → discard
Never-submit list: missing headers alone, introspection alone, clickjacking alone, self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, rate limits on non-critical forms, cookie flags alone.
Engagement Management
Start an engagement:
Register scope: Agents use register_scope() and register_scope_batch() to register all in-scope domains, apps, and API endpoints. Bug bounty scope tables can be pasted directly for automatic parsing.
Set up auth: The auth phase detects WAF vendor via response headers, captures tokens/cookies, and saves authentication context for downstream phases.
Track everything: Every test, tool run, and finding is automatically tracked via MCP tools. At the end of an engagement, get_coverage() and get_tool_coverage() verify nothing was missed before report generation.
Report Generation
After validation, generate a professional report:
The report generator first runs get_coverage() and phase_gate_check() to verify all phases passed, then produces a CVSS-scored report with evidence, PoC output, and remediation guidance. Platform-specific reporters handle HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, Immunefi, and client-facing DOCX formats.
Agent Reference
Dristi ships with 87 autonomous agents organized into 5 categories:
Pipeline Agents (12)
| Agent | Phase | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| autopilot | Full | Fully autonomous P1–P12 orchestration |
| consult | Full | Interactive pipeline — pauses at every phase for human guidance |
| scope | 1 | Engagement scaffold, scope boundaries, credentials |
| auth | 2 | Authenticate to target, capture tokens, cookies, session state |
| pintel | 3 | Passive intel — WHOIS, M365/Azure, cloud buckets, spoof check |
| osint | 3 | OSINT methodology — source verification, identity correlation |
| recon | 4 | Subdomain enum, DNS, crawl, params, nuclei, secrets |
| surface | 5 | Attack surface ranking, endpoint prioritization |
| hunt | 6 | Dispatch hunt-* agents based on surface analysis |
| deepthink | 7 | (conditional) First-principles gap analysis when hunt stalls |
| exploit | 8 | Deep-research exploitation, WAF bypass, finding chains |
| search | 9 | (conditional) Research CVEs, bypass techniques, disclosed reports |
| capture | 10 | Evidence collection, screenshots, HAR sanitization |
| validate | 11 | Re-run PoCs, 7-Question Gate, severity grading |
| report | 12 | Coverage check, phase gates, final deliverable |
Hunt Agents (54)
| Agent | Vulnerability Class |
|---|---|
| hunt-xss | Cross-Site Scripting |
| hunt-sqli | SQL Injection |
| hunt-ssrf | Server-Side Request Forgery |
| hunt-rce | Remote Code Execution |
| hunt-idor | Insecure Direct Object Reference |
| hunt-ato | Account Takeover |
| hunt-lfi | Local File Inclusion / Path Traversal |
| hunt-ssti | Server-Side Template Injection |
| hunt-csrf | Cross-Site Request Forgery |
| hunt-cors | CORS Misconfiguration |
| hunt-nosqli | NoSQL Injection |
| hunt-oauth | OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect |
| hunt-jwt-confusion | JWT Algorithm Confusion |
| hunt-graphql | GraphQL API |
| hunt-xxe | XML External Entity |
| hunt-brute-force | Brute Force / Credential Stuffing |
| hunt-race-condition | Race Conditions |
| hunt-http-smuggling | HTTP Request Smuggling |
| hunt-host-header | Host Header Injection |
| hunt-open-redirect | Open Redirect |
| hunt-cache-poison | Web Cache Poisoning |
| hunt-file-upload | File Upload Vulnerabilities |
| hunt-deserialization | Insecure Deserialization |
| hunt-business-logic | Business Logic Flaws |
| hunt-subdomain | Subdomain Takeover |
| hunt-dom | DOM-based Vulnerabilities |
| hunt-session | Session Management Flaws |
| hunt-mfa-bypass | MFA Bypass |
| hunt-auth-bypass | Authentication Bypass |
| hunt-misc | Catch-all / Emerging Threats |
| hunt-clickjacking | Clickjacking |
| hunt-crlf | CRLF Injection |
| hunt-dependency-confusion | Dependency Confusion |
| hunt-http-param-pollution | HTTP Parameter Pollution |
| hunt-mass-assignment | Mass Assignment |
| hunt-prototype-pollution | Prototype Pollution |
Platform Agents (15)
| Agent | Platform |
|---|---|
| hunt-k8s | Kubernetes |
| hunt-springboot | Spring Boot |
| hunt-laravel | Laravel |
| hunt-nextjs | Next.js / Vercel |
| hunt-nodejs | Node.js / Express |
| hunt-sharepoint | SharePoint |
| hunt-aspnet | ASP.NET / .NET |
| hunt-cicd | CI/CD Pipeline |
| hunt-saml | SAML SSO |
| hunt-llm-ai | LLM / AI Security |
| hunt-ldap | LDAP Injection |
| hunt-tls-network | TLS / SSL |
| hunt-websocket | WebSocket Security |
| hunt-source-leak | Source Code Leak |
| hunt-cloud-misconfig | Cloud Misconfiguration |
Specialty Agents (10)
| Agent | Domain |
|---|---|
| cloud-iam-deep | AWS / Azure / GCP IAM |
| enterprise-vpn-attack | Cisco / Fortinet / Citrix VPN Appliances |
| m365-entra-attack | Microsoft 365 / Entra ID |
| okta-attack | Okta Identity Platform |
| supply-chain-attack-recon | Supply Chain Security |
| meme-coin-audit | Meme Coin / Token Audit |
| apk-redteam-pipeline | Android APK Assessment |
| offensive-osint | Offensive OSINT |
| hunt-ntlm-info | NTLM Information Disclosure |
| hunt-api-misconfig | API Misconfiguration |
Supporting Agents (12)
| Agent | Role |
|---|---|
| web2-recon | Web recon specialist |
| web2-vuln-classes | Vulnerability class reference |
| osint-methodology | OSINT methodology guide |
| redteam-mindset | Red team operations |
| redteam-report-template | Report template generator |
| report-writing | Security report writer |
| triage-validation | Finding triage — 7-Question Gate |
| evidence-hygiene | Evidence sanitization |
| bugcrowd-reporting | Bugcrowd VRT reporting |
| bug-bounty | Bug bounty master methodology |
| hunt-dispatch | Hunt agent dispatcher |
| explore | Codebase exploration |
Pipeline
Dristi's 12-phase pipeline covers the full bug bounty workflow:
| Phase | Name | Key Activities |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Code Analysis | Source code review, entry point identification |
| 1 | Scope | Engagement config, scope registration, auth setup |
| 2 | Auth | Authenticate, capture tokens, session state |
| 3 | Intel | Passive OSINT, WHOIS, cloud buckets, spoof check |
| 4 | Recon | Subdomains, live hosts, crawl, params, nuclei, secrets |
| 5 | Surface | Attack surface analysis, endpoint prioritization |
| 6 | Hunt | Dedicated hunt agents per vulnerability class |
| 7 | DeepThink | (conditional) Gap analysis, first-principles reasoning |
| 8 | Exploit | Systematic validation, PoC execution, exploitation |
| 9 | Search | (conditional) Research CVEs, bypass techniques, reports |
| 10 | Capture | Evidence collection, screenshots, network captures |
| 11 | Validate | PoC re-validation, impact assessment, severity grading |
| 12 | Report | Coverage check, phase gates, final deliverable |